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We propose extending Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) by an operator 〈i ⊑ Γ〉ϕ to express
that i can distribute its powers to a set of sub-agents Γ in a way which satisfies ATL condition
ϕ on the strategic ability of the coalitions they may form, possibly together with others agents.
We prove the decidability of model-checking of formulas whose 〈. ⊑ .〉-subformulas have the form
〈i1 ⊑ Γ1〉 . . . 〈im ⊑ Γm〉ϕ , with no further occurrences of 〈.⊑ .〉 in ϕ .
Introduction
The basic co-operation modality of Alternating-time Temporal Logics (ATL, [AHK97, AHK02]) invites
perceiving agent coalitions as single agents who enjoy the combined powers of the coalition members.
We investigate an operator to reverse this, by addressing the possibility to partition the strategic ability
of a single agent among several sub-agents. We write 〈i ⊑ Γ〉ϕ to denote that agent i can partition its
strategic ability among the members of a set of fresh sub-agents Γ in a way which satisfies ϕ , a formula
written in terms of the new agents Γ who assume i’s powers, and the other original agents, except i. For
example, a purchase scenario with the vendor represented by salesperson SP and delivery team DT can
be described as
〈vendor ⊑ SP,DT〉
(
〈〈customer,SP〉〉✸purchase agreement ∧
[[SP]]✷(purchase agreement ⇒ 〈〈DT,customer〉〉 ◦delivery)
)
.
The combined powers of all of i’s sub-agents are always equal to i’s:
〈〈∆∪{i}〉〉ϕ ⇔ [i⊑ Γ]〈〈(∆\{i})∪Γ〉〉ϕ
where [i ⊑ Γ] stands for ¬〈i ⊑ Γ〉¬. Coalitions ∆ 6⊇ Γ may be weaker than i, but also have abilities
contributed by agents from ∆\Γ. The realizability of schemes such as the example one generally depends
on the basic composition of agents’ actions. For instance, simple mechanisms make it always possible
to deny the proper subsets of Γ all substantial strategic ability or make Γ use simple majority vote as
indicated by the validity of the formula:
¬〈〈 /0〉〉ϕ ∧〈〈i〉〉ϕ ⇒ 〈i ⊑ Γ〉
∧
∆(Γ
¬〈〈∆〉〉ϕ ∧〈i⊑ Γ〉
∧
∆⊂Γ,|∆|≤|Γ\∆|
¬〈〈∆〉〉ϕ ∧
∧
∆⊆Γ,|∆|>|Γ\∆|
〈〈∆〉〉ϕ .
Subtracting strategic ability from one agent and transfering it in the form of a virtual sub-agent to another
is a way of implementing delegation. Refinement can be instrumental in expressing the alienability of
the ability in question. E.g.,
〈〈i〉〉 ◦unlock∧¬〈〈 j〉〉 ◦unlock∧〈i⊑ i′,key〉(¬〈〈i′〉〉 ◦unlock∧〈〈 j,key︸ ︷︷ ︸
j′
〉〉 ◦unlock)
states the possibility of giving i’s unlocking ability separate identity key which enables its passage to j.
The relevant vocabulary introduced consists of key itself, { j,key} for j key-in-hand and i′ for i without
key, respectively.
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Notably we investigate refining and delegating powers and not responsibilities as in, e.g., [NR02].
Sub-agents can pursue their own goals. As it becomes clear below, they do so by influencing the choice
of actions on behalf of their super-agent with the share of the super-agents’ power given to them. Unlike
proper delegation as in, e.g., [vdHWW10] and [BFD02], where givers and receivers of control co-exist,
just 〈i ⊑ Γ〉 is about replacing i by its sub-agents Γ.
Our main result about ATL with 〈. ⊑ .〉 in this paper is a model-checking procedure for the subset
in which 〈. ⊑ .〉 is restricted to occur only in subformulas of the form 〈i1 ⊑ Γ1〉 . . . 〈im ⊑ Γm〉ϕ , with no
further occurrences of 〈. ⊑ .〉 in ϕ . This is sufficient for the handling of scenarios like the example one
above, but with refinements affecting more than one primary agent.
Structure of the paper After brief formal preliminaries on ATL on GCMs, we introduce our proposed
operator and model-checking algorithm. We conclude by briefly commenting on some more related
work, assessing our result and mentioning some work in progress.
1 Preliminaries
Definition 1 (concurrent game structures and models) A concurrent game structure (CGS) for some
given set of agents Σ = {1, . . . ,N} is a tuple of the form 〈W,〈Acti : i ∈ Σ〉,o〉 where
W is a non-empty set of states;
Acti is a non-empty set of actions, i ∈ Σ; given a Γ⊆ Σ, ActΓ stands for ∏
i∈Γ
Acti;
o : W ×ActΣ →W is a transition function.
A concurrent game model (CGM) for Σ and atomic propositions AP is a tuple of the form 〈W,〈Acti :
i ∈ Σ〉,o,V 〉 where 〈W,〈Acti : i ∈ Σ〉,o〉 is a CGS for Σ and V ⊆W ×AP is a valuation relation.
In the sequel we always assume Acti, i ∈ Σ to be pairwise disjoint.
Below we write aΓ to indicate that a ∈ ActΓ where Γ⊆ Σ. If a ∈ Act∆ and Γ⊆ ∆, then aΓ also stands
for the subvector of a consisting of the actions for the members of Γ. Given disjoint Γ,∆ ⊆ Σ, we write
aΓ ·b∆ for c ∈ ActΓ∪∆ which is defined by putting ci = ai for i ∈ Γ and ci = bi for i ∈ ∆.
Definition 2 (ATL on CGMs) The syntax of AT L formulas ϕ is given by the BNF
ϕ ,ψ ::= ⊥ | p | (ϕ ⇒ ψ) | 〈〈Γ〉〉 ◦ϕ | 〈〈Γ〉〉(ϕUψ) | [[Γ]](ϕUψ)
where p ranges over atomic propositions and Γ ranges over finite sets of agents. Satisfaction of ATL
formulas are defined in terms of strategies. A strategy for i ∈ Σ in CGM M = 〈W,〈Acti : i ∈ Σ〉,o,V 〉 is
a function from W+ to Acti. Given a vector of strategies sΓ = 〈si : i ∈ Γ〉 for the members of Γ ⊆ Σ, the
possible outcomes of Γ starting from state w and following sΓ is the set of infinite runs
out(w,sΓ) = {w0w1 . . . ∈W ω : w0 = w,wk+1 = o(wk,ak),a0a1 . . . ∈ ActωΣ , akΓ = sΓ(w0 . . .wk),k < ω}.
Assuming a fixed M, we write SΓ for the set of all vectors of strategies for Γ in M. Satisfaction is defined
on CGMs M, states w ∈W and formulas ϕ :
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M,w 6|=⊥
M,w |= p iff V (w, p)
M,w |= ϕ ⇒ ψ iff either M,w |= ψ or M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= 〈〈Γ〉〉 ◦ϕ iff there exists an sΓ ∈ SΓ s. t. w0w1 . . . ∈ out(w,sΓ) implies M,w1 |= ϕ
M,w |= 〈〈Γ〉〉(ϕUψ) iff there exists an sΓ ∈ SΓ s. t. for any w0w1 . . . ∈ out(w,sΓ)
there exists a k < ω s. t. M,w0 |= ϕ , . . . ,M,wk−1 |= ϕ and M,wk |= ψ
M,w |= [[Γ]](ϕUψ) iff for every sΓ ∈ SΓ there exists a w0w1 . . . ∈ out(w,sΓ)
and a k < ω s. t. M,w0 |= ϕ , . . . ,M,wk−1 |= ϕ and M,wk |= ψ
⊤, ¬, ∨, ∧ and ⇔ and the remaining combinations of 〈〈.〉〉 and [[.]] with the temporal connectives ◦, ✸
and ✷ are regarded as derived constructs. See, e.g., [AHK02] for the definitions.
2 Refining Strategic Ability in ATL: ATL⊑
Definition 3 (Γ-to-i homomorphisms of CGMs) Given Σ and AP, an i ∈ Σ and some non-empty set
of agent names Γ which is disjoint with Σ, consider CGMs M = 〈W,〈Act j : j ∈ Σ〉,o,V 〉 and M′ =
〈W ′,〈Act′j : j ∈ Σ′〉,o′,V ′〉 for AP, and Σ and Σ′ = (Σ\{i})∪Γ, respectively. A mapping h : ∏j∈Γ Act
′
j →
Acti is a Γ-to-i homomorphism from M′ to M, if
W ′ =W , V ′ =V and Act j = Act′j for j ∈ Σ\{i};
range h = Acti and o′(w,a) = o(w,aΣ\{i} ·h(aΓ)) for all w ∈W and all a ∈ Act′Σ′ .
Informally, if M is a Γ-to-i homomorphism of M, then the strategic ability of i in M is distributed among
the new agents j ∈ Γ in M′. For each action ai of i in M there exists a vector of actions aΓ for the members
of Γ in M′ such that h(aΓ) = ai. Together with the correspondence between the outcome functions o and
o′ of the two models, this means that the combined powers of the members of Γ in M′ are equal to those
of i in M, but proper sub-coalitions of Γ may be less powerful. Next we introduce the operator which is
central to this work. Let M, i and Γ be as above.
Definition 4 (refinement operator) Let ϕ be written in terms of (Σ\{i})∪Γ. Then
M,w |= 〈i ⊑ Γ〉ϕ
iff there exist an M′ for Σ′ and AP such that M′,w |= ϕ , and a Γ-to-i homomorphism from M′ to M.
The occurrences of j ∈ Γ in 〈i ⊑ Γ〉ϕ are bound in the usual sense. Informally, 〈i ⊑ Γ〉ϕ means that i
can distribute its powers among the members of Γ so that ϕ holds in about the new set of agents. Its dual
[i ⊑ Γ]ϕ means that ϕ holds regardless of how the powers of i are distributed among the agents from Γ.
3 Model-checking 〈.⊑ .〉∗-Flat ATL⊑
〈.⊑ .〉∗-flat ATL⊑ is the subset of ATL⊑ in which 〈.⊑ .〉-subformulas have the form
〈i1 ⊑ Γ1〉 . . . 〈im ⊑ Γm〉ϕ (1)
where ϕ has no further occurrences of 〈.⊑ .〉. Note that only occurrences of 〈.⊑ .〉 of the same polarity
can be chained. E.g., if ϕ and ψ are 〈. ⊑ .〉-free, then 〈〈i〉〉✸(〈i ⊑ Γ〉〈 j ⊑ ∆〉ϕ ∧ [k ⊑ ϒ][l ⊑ Ξ]ψ) is
〈. ⊑ .〉∗-flat, but [i ⊑ Γ]〈 j ⊑ ∆〉ϕ and 〈i ⊑ Γ〉〈〈k〉〉✸〈 j ⊑ ∆〉ϕ are not. Our algorithm reduces the model-
checking problem to satisfiability in the 〈〈.〉〉◦-subset of ATL, or, equivalently, in Coalition Logic [Pau02],
which is known to be decidable. We first do the case of m = 1 and ϕ being a boolean combination of
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〈〈.〉〉◦-formulas with boolean combinations of atomic propositions as the arguments of 〈〈.〉〉◦, in full detail.
Then we explain how the technique extends to arbitrary m, and, finally, however inefficiently, to formulas
of the form (1) with an 〈.⊑ .〉-free ϕ in which the use of the ATL connectives is unrestricted.
The case of m = 1 Consider some formula 〈i ⊑ Γ〉ϕ with ϕ restricted as above. Let CGM M be as
above and consider a CGM M′ = 〈W,〈Act′i : i ∈ Σ′〉,o′,V 〉, Σ′ = Σ\{i}∪Γ, and a Γ-to-i homomorphism
h from M′ to M. Let 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ χ be a subformula of ϕ . For M′,w |= 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ χ to hold, there should be a
vector of actions a∆ such that, for any bΓ\∆, a∆\Γ · h(a∆∩Γ · bΓ\∆) gives ∆ \Γ∪{i} a strategy to achieve
◦χ in M. For a fixed a∆\Γ this means
h(a∆∩Γ ·bΓ\∆) ∈ {ai ∈ Acti : ∀cΣ\(∆∪{i})M,o(w,a∆\Γ ·ai · cΣ\(∆∪{i})) |= χ} (2)
Henceforth we write Ai,a∆\Γ,w,χ for the subset of Acti in (2).
Now consider a CGM M = 〈W ,〈Act j : j ∈ Γ〉,o,V 〉 for Γ as the set of agents, AP = Acti as the set
of atomic propositions and W = Acti ∪{w0} as the set of states. Let V (w,a) be equivalent to w = a for
a ∈ Acti, thus enabling reference to each individual action of i. The intended meaning of the states of M
from Acti is to represent the possible choices of i’s actions by the members of Γ; w0 is a distinguished
reference state. Let Act j = Act′j for j ∈ Γ, and let o(w0,a) = h(a) for all a ∈ ActΓ. Then
M,w0 |= 〈〈 /0〉〉 ◦
∨
a∈Acti
a∧
∧
a,b∈Acti,a6=b
〈〈 /0〉〉 ◦¬(a∧b)∧
∧
a∈Acti
〈〈Γ〉〉 ◦a, (3)
since, due to the surjectivity of h, each of i’s actions can be enforced by Γ, which is the grand coalition
in M.
Let the translation t replace subformulas of ϕ of the form 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦χ by their corresponding∨
a∆\Γ∈Act∆\Γ
〈〈∆∩Γ〉〉 ◦
∨
ai∈Ai,a∆\Γ,w,χ
ai.
Then M,w |= 〈i ⊑ Γ〉ϕ is equivalent to M,w0 |= t(ϕ).
Conversely, let a model M = 〈W ,〈Act j : j ∈ Γ〉,o,V 〉 exist such that M,w0 |= t(ϕ) and (3) hold. Then
we can define an M′ and a Γ-to-i homomorphism h to witness M,w |= 〈i⊑ Γ〉ϕ as follows. We put Act′j =
Act j, j ∈ Γ. For every aΓ ∈ ActΓ, we define h(aΓ) as the unique ai ∈ Acti such that M,o(w0,aΓ) |= ai.
The identity o′(w,a) = o(w0,h(a)) determines o′. Now a direct check shows that M,w |= 〈i⊑ Γ〉ϕ .
Hence, the existence of a model M which satisfies t(ϕ) and (3) at some state is equivalent to the
satisfaction of ϕ at the given state w of the given M. Since satisfiability of formulas such as t(ϕ) and (3)
is solvable, this entails the solvability of model-checking 〈.⊑ .〉-formulas.
The case of m > 1 To keep notation simple, let m = 2, i.e., consider formulas of the form 〈1⊑ Γ1〉〈2⊑
Γ2〉ϕ . Bigger m are handled analogously. We first revise condition (2), with respect to formulas 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦
χ ∈ Subf(ϕ) in which ∆ ⊆ Σ′, Σ′ = Σ\{1,2}∪Γ1 ∪Γ2. The m = 2-form of (2) is about sets of pairs of
actions, for 1 and 2, respectively. Given a fixed a∆\(Γ1∪Γ2), (2) assumes the form
〈h1(a∆∩Γ1 ·bΓ1\∆),h2(a∆∩Γ2 ·bΓ2\∆)〉 ∈
{〈a1,a2〉 ∈ Act1×Act2 : ∀cΣ\(∆∪{1,2})M,o(w,a1 ·a2 ·a∆\(Γ1∪Γ2) · cΣ\(∆∪{1,2}) |= χ}
We denote the subset of Act1×Act2 above by A1,2,a∆\(Γ1∪Γ2),w,χ . The ability of ∆ to achieve χ in one step
from w is equivalent to the ability of each of ∆∩Γ1 and ∆∩Γ2 to enforce actions a1 and a2 on behalf
of 1 and 2, respectively, so that 〈a1,a2〉 ∈ A1,2,a∆\(Γ1∪Γ2),w,χ for some appopriate a∆\(Γ1∪Γ2). Therefore we
define t(〈〈∆〉〉 ◦χ) as∨
a∆\(Γ1∪Γ2)∈Act∆\(Γ1∪Γ2)
∨
A1×A2⊆A1,2,a∆\(Γ1∪Γ2),w,χ
〈〈∆∩Γ1〉〉 ◦
∨
a1∈A1
a1∧〈〈∆∩Γ2〉〉 ◦
∨
a2∈A2
a2.
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Formulas obtained by the 〈1 ⊑ Γ1〉〈2 ⊑ Γ2〉-form of t are boolean combinations of formulas of the form
〈〈∆〉〉 ◦χ where ∆ ⊆ Γk and χ is a disjunction of members of Actk, for k being either 1 or 2. In the single
〈.⊑ .〉 case we are interested in the existence of a satisfying model M for t(ϕ) as the transitin function o
of such a model can be used to determine the homomorphism h we need. For the case of m = 2, the part
of M is played by a pair of models Mk = 〈Actk∪{w0,k}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W k
,〈Actk, j : j ∈ Γk〉,ok,V k〉 to represent the ability
of coalitions withing Γk to enforce actions with some desired effect on behalf of agent k, k = 1,2. We are
interested in the satisfiability of t-translations at pairs of such models in the following sense. Consider
a 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ χ ∈ Subf(t(ϕ)) with either ∆ ⊆ Γ1 and χ a boolean combination of atomic propositions from
AP1 = Act1, or ∆⊆ Γ2 and χ a boolean combination of atomic propositions from AP2 = Act2. We define
M1,M2,w0,1,w0,2 |= 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦χ as Mk,w0,k |= 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦χ for ψ being 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦χ with ∆ ⊆ Γk and χ written in
terms of Actk, k = 1,2. The clauses for ⊥ and for formulas built using ⇒ are as usual.
Satisfiability at pair of models of the special type of formulas above straightforwardly reduces to the
usual satisfiability at single models once t(ϕ) is given a disjunctive normal form: a t(ϕ) of this form
is satisfiable iff some of its disjunctive members is, and each disjunctive member can be viewed as a
conjunction of two formulas ψk, ψk being a conjunction of formulas of the form 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ χ with ∆ ⊆ Γk
and χ written in terms of APk, k = 1,2. The satisfiability of ψ1 ∧ψ2 is obviously equivalent to the
satisfiability of both ψ1 and ψ2 in the usual sense, at a model of the type of Mk.
Formulas (1) with arbitrary 〈. ⊑ .〉-free ϕ Removing the restriction on ϕs to be in the flat 〈〈.〉〉◦-
subset of ATL makes it necessary to synthesise an M′ and the respective h with conditions such as (the
many-dimensional form of) (2) associated with not just one but all the states w of M. To enable this, we
first elimitate the use of (.U.) in ϕ using that |W | is known.1 Assuming that ϕ is (.U.)-free, and that
m = 1 again, for the sake of simplicity, we consider assignments ‖.‖ : Subf(ϕ)→ 2W . We are interested
in the existence of an assignment ‖.‖ such that an M′ that admits a Γ-to-i homomorphism h to M exists
in which ϕ holds at the given state w and {w′ : M′,w′ |= ψ} = ‖ψ‖ for all ψ ∈ Subf(ϕ). For ψ being
some p ∈ AP the latter condition holds iff ‖p‖ is as detemined from the valuation V of M. For ψ being
either ⊥, or with ⇒ as the main connective, or of the form 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ψ ′ where ∆∩Γ = /0, ‖ψ‖ is similarly
unambiguously determined by the identities ‖⊥‖ = /0, ‖ψ ′ ⇒ ψ ′′‖ = ‖ψ ′‖ ⇒ ‖ψ ′′‖ and ‖〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ψ ′‖ =
{w′ ∈W : M,w′ |= 〈〈∆〉〉◦ψ ′}. The latter set can be computed using just ATL model-checking. Similarly,
‖〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ψ ′‖ = {w′ ∈ W : M,w′ |= 〈〈(∆ \ Γ)∪ {i}〉〉 ◦ψ ′} in case ∆ ⊇ Γ. Therefore every acceptable
assignment is determined unambiguously as soon as its values ‖〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ψ‖ for 〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ψ ∈ Subf(ϕ) such
that /0 6= ∆∩Γ 6= Γ are specified, and the latter values satisfy the inclusions
{w′ ∈W : M,w′ |= 〈〈(∆\Γ)〉〉 ◦ψ ′} ⊆ ‖〈〈∆〉〉 ◦ψ‖ ⊆ {w′ ∈W : M,w′ |= 〈〈(∆\Γ)∪{i}〉〉 ◦ψ ′}.
Assuming an assignment ‖.‖ of the above form, the existence of the required o′ and h which link M′ to
M depends on the satisfiability of the conjunction∧
〈〈∆〉〉◦ψ∈Subf(ϕ)
/0 6=∆∩Γ6=Γ
∧
w′∈‖〈〈∆〉〉◦ψ‖
∨
a∆\Γ∈Act∆\Γ
〈〈∆∩Γ〉〉 ◦
∨
ai∈Ai,a∆\Γ,w,‖ψ‖
ai
at a model of the type of M already introduced above. As expected, here Ai,a∆\Γ,w,‖ψ‖ = {ai ∈ Acti :
∀cΣ\(∆∪{i})(o(w,a∆\Γ ·ai · cΣ\(∆∪{i})) ∈ X)}.
Obviously the algorithm implied by the above argument is only good to conclude decidability in
principle because of the forbidding number of ‖.‖s to be considered.
1This can cause an O(|W |)-blowup in the number of the subformulas of the given ϕ , making it clear that we are after nothing
more than decidability in principle.
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4 Concluding Remarks
Related Work There is an analogy between our 〈. ⊑ .〉 and the refinement quantifier of Refinement
Modal Logic [BvDF+12] and its extensions to special classes of multimodal frames [HFD12]. For-
mal studies focusing on controlling the decisions of self-interested delegates can be found in [KW12,
EPW13]. A notion of refinement of alternating transition systems, ATL’s original type of models from
[AHK97], allowing, unlike [AHKV98], the powers of different sets of agents to be related, was studied
in [RS01]. The approach of [RS01] suggests considering a refinement modality of the form 〈∆ ⊑ Γ〉
with |∆| ≥ 1. The authors of [RS01] stopped short of extending ATL syntax by such an operator. Our
model-checking algorithm extends to the case of non-singleton coalition-to-coalition refinement as in our
CGM-based setting in a straightforward way. Abstraction techniques with the agents being just knowers
were studied in [ED07, CDLR09]. Abstraction involving over- and under-approximation of coalitions
to contain model size was proposed in [KL11]. A formalization of teaming sub-agents under a sched-
uler as turn-based simulation was proposed in [GF10, GPS13]. Modelling varying the considered set of
agents is addressed in modular interpreted systems [JA˚07, JMS13]. Distinctively, our setting is about
varying the set of agents in a system by just redistributing strategic ability, with the overall activities
which the system can accommodate unchanged. In CGMs, the effect of actions is defined by means of
the transition function. Considering actions which are complete with a description of their effect and an
additional parameter to the co-operation modality meant to specify the availability of actions to agents
as in [HLW13, Her14] enables specifying delegation too, by varying availability of actions to express
their changing hands with their effect on system state being transferred too. This form of delegation is,
broadly speaking, complementary to our work as we propose reasoning about migrating the ability to
enforce temporal conditions, and synthesizing implementations in terms of actions through satisfiability
checking.
Some Work in Progress 〈.⊑ .〉 admits a definition with no reference to Γ-to-i homomorphisms, which
enables translating the 〈〈.〉〉◦-subset of ATL⊑ into a promising looking subset of many-sorted predicate
logic or, similarly, into 〈〈.〉〉◦-subsets of explicit strategy languages such as strategy logics [CHP07,
MMV10]. Exploring the tractability of the translated formulas is one way of addressing satisfiability in
ATL⊑, which is yet to be done. The translation gives rise to a companion operator, which holds some
promise as the means for indirect axiomatization. Regarding direct axiomatization, for any fixed i and Γ,
〈i ⊑ Γ〉 is a KD- and, with some adjustment to compensate for switching to the local agent vocabulary
Σ \ {i} ∪ Γ, also a T-modality. We have also established some non-trivial specific basic equivalences
leading to a normal form, and a conventional-looking rule for introducing negative occurrences of 〈.⊑ .〉,
but still lack sufficiently strong axioms for the positive occurrences.
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